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Depopulation trend in Ukraine caused to a large extent by the lowest low fertility rates 
raises serious concerns about long-WHUPHFRQRPLFJURZWKDQGWKHFRXQWU\¶VIXWXUHLQ
general. In this paper we investigate the existence and the extent of the motherhood wage 
penalty as a potential impediment to having (more) children in a unique institutional 
environment. This environment is characterized by: de jure family supportive labor laws but 
de facto no legal enforcement of these laws; publicly subsidized childcare; and low cultural 
support for maternal employment, combined with extensive involvement of grand-parents. 
Relying on the data from the Ukrainian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey over the period 
from 1997 to 2007, we find that the overall motherhood wage penalty in Ukraine is much 
lower than in countries with similar de jure family policies and cultural norms. It constitutes 
approximately 19%, controlling for individual unobserved heterogeneity, a number of 
human capital characteristics, actual time in the labor force, and selection into employment. 
We also find that the motherhood wage penalty differs by education, age at birth of first 






                                                          
1 The authors are grateful to Nataliia Shapoval for her excellent research assistance, Ina Ganguli for the constructive 
review and valuable suggestions, Ian Svejnar and other ƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚƐŽĨƚŚĞ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů^ǇŵƉŽƐŝƵŵ “hŬƌĂŝŶĞ ?ƐĐĂƉĞ






Since its independence, Ukraine has been experiencing decades-long demographic 
crisis due to high out- and low in-migration, a severe population health crisis and high 
mortality (especially among prime-DJHGPDOHV DVZHOO DV WKH ³ORZHVW ORZ´ IHUWLOLW\ UDWHV 
(Perelli-Harris 2005). This has led to a population decline from more than 52 million people 
to ~42.5 million people in 2015, which shows no signs of reversal in the near future. 
Moreover, this demographic crisis is associated with considerable changes in the population 
age structure, with the share of population aged 65+ projected to increase to 26.3% by the 
year 2050 (Safarova, Scherbov and Pirozhkov 2008). This raises concerns about further 
declines in the rate of economic growth (Bloom, Canning, and Fink 2010, Lisenkova, 
McQuaid, and Wright 2010), as well as sustainability of the pension system and, therefore, 
calls for the prioritization of the policies affecting demographic trends. 
In spite of the existence of indirect policies, such as maternal/parental leave and 
antidiscrimination labor market laws, currently only the baby bonus (a government payment 
to parents of a newborn baby or adopted child to assist with the costs of childrearing) is 
discussed in Ukrainian policy circles as a measure to address the issue of low fertility. Over 
the course of 1990s this bonus had been set at an extremely low level but had been increased 
several times over the course of the 2000s (See Appendix Table A1). Although no rigorous 
evaluation of this pro-natalist policy has been undertaken, limited publications in Ukrainian 
sources (including government reports) show no plausible evidence that the existing baby 
bonus results in a noticeable impact on the overall fertility, mostly shifting of the timing of 
births by those who would have had the same number of children anyway. There are also 
some concerns about sizeable increases in fertility among poor and marginalized population 
groups, where sometimes the baby bonus becomes the only source of income.2 Potentially, 
this indicates that there is a factor (e.g. a motherhood wage penalty) not taken into account by 
policy makers, which may be misleading their choices of policy measures. One obvious 
candidate is the wage gap between mothers and non-mothers (the motherhood wage penalty), 
which would be consistent with the disproportionate effect of the baby bonus across the 
income distribution. 
The motherhood wage penalty is a well-documented phenomenon in economics 
literature. Maternity can have a negative impact on women¶V opportunities in the labor 







market, not only through the decrease of hours devoted to work, but also through career 
interruptions, loss of human capital while child caring, smaller mobility compared to women 
without children, lower productivity on the job during the period when children are small, as 
well as due to statistical discrimination. An interesting feature of the most recent literature in 
this area is that the motherhood wage penalty still exists, albeit becoming somewhat smaller, 
after controlling for most of the above-mentioned human capital related explanations, and 
selection into employment. The magnitude of the remaining motherhood wage penalty varies 
significantly from virtually zero in Finland, Sweden, Belgium, Israel, to small (5-10%) in 
France, Canada, UK, Poland, Slovakia and Czech R., to moderate (10-15%) in US, Russia 
and Hungary, and large (20-33%) in most of continental Europe and Ireland (Budig, Misra, 
and Boeckmann 2012). Some authors have tried to explore this cross-country variation with 
respect to the institutional settings and cultural norms, with most focus on family policies. 
A broad range of family policies has been advocated and introduced around the world 
over the past decades, mainly in industrialized countries but also in the post-socialist states 
and some developing countries. The aim of these policies has been to ease the conflict 
EHWZHHQZRPHQ¶VFDUHHUFKRLFHVDQGIHUWLOLW\E\DGGUHVVLQJWKRVHPDUNHWSURFHVVHVZKLFKDUH
putting women at a disadvantage in the labor market. The most widespread policy in this 
spectrum is the maternal/parental leave system promoted by the International Labour Office 
through its three Maternity Protection Conventions (No. 3 in 1919, No. 103 in 1952, No. 183 
in 2000).3 So far, 66 ILO member states have ratified at least one of those three Conventions, 
and 43 have ratified the ILO Workers with Family Responsibilities Convention (No. 156 in 
1981) which marked the recognition that ͆a change in the traditional role of men as well as 
the role of women in society and in the family is needed to achieve full equality between men 
and women´ ,/2  These maternal/parental leave policies are usually stipulated as 
mandates which establish job retention rights over a specified period of time following 
childbirth. Although such mandates are cheap for governments to introduce and can be 
beneficial in terms of limiting the wage effects of work interruptions via retaining the 
ZRUNHUV¶ ILUP-specific human capital, they are imposing considerable non-wage costs on 
employers which in the equilibrium are transmitted into lower wages for women (Ruhm 
1998). 







Another complementary policy is provision of subsidized or publicly provided 
childcare, which LQFUHDVHV ZRPHQ¶V LQFHQWLYHV WR SDLG ZRUN YLD WZR FKDQQHOV: ³GLUHFWO\
raising earnings net of childcare costs and lowering the opportunity cost of employment 
through accHVVWRTXDOLW\FKLOGFDUH´*DQJODQG=LHIOH%\GHVLJQ, the cost of this type 
of family policy is borne by taxpayers and therefore is not passed directly or indirectly onto 
working mothers or working women in general. The degree of generosity and the extent of 
coverage of these policies have been considered in the most recent literature as potential 
explanations for the cross-country differences in the motherhood wage penalty. For example, 
the highest wage penalty for motherhood is found in Germany, where the maternity leave 
policy is very generous but pre-kindergarten childcare is rather weak (Gangl and Ziefle 2009). 
Another strand of literature relates the motherhood wage penalty and family policies 
through the prism of cultural norms. It reaches the conclusion that both parental leave and 
public childcare are associated with higher earnings for mothers when cultural support for 
maternal employment is high, while putting upward pressure on the motherhood wage penalty 
where cultural attitudes support the male breadwinner/female caregiver model (Budig, Misra, 
and Boeckmann 2012). 
Documenting the existence and extent of the motherhood wage penalty in Ukraine is 
very timely and policy relevant, given the serious concerns about the demographic crisis. 
Moreover, in light of the above-mentioned literature relating the size of the motherhood wage 
penalty to the interaction between the institutional settings and cultural norms, Ukraine 
represents an academically interesting context to study the phenomenon. First of all, it has 
relatively generous maternity leave policy: 100% paid maternity leave of 18 weeks, and the 
possibility to take unpaid leave of up to three years and, in case of child sickness, up to six 
years, with a mandated guarantee of return to the same workplace. In addition, such a leave, 
with a guaranteed return to workplace, can be taken by any other close relative of the child 
(e.g. father, grandmother, grandfather). Second, Ukraine has inherited an extensive network 
of public childcare facilities which can accommodate children from very a early age as women 
in the Soviet Union did not have extended maternity leave up to the mid-1980s. These 
facilities have always been heavily subsidized through local and state funding. Therefore, 
following the literature we should expect to either find a negligible or no motherhood wage 
penalty, as in the Scandinavian countries with high degree of cultural support for maternal 
employment, or a high motherhood wage penalty as, for example, in Germany, where the 





differences: the quality of the legal environment with respect to the enforcement of family-
friendly and anti-discrimination labor market policies; and cultural norms supporting 
significant involvement of grandparents in childcare, combined with the relatively early 
retirement age. The former undermines workers¶ ability to protect their rights in courts, which 
would imply no economic costs of maternity leave mandates for employers. The latter lowers 
the opportunity cost of employment by increasing availability of alternative high-quality child 
care. Both work towards lowering the motherhood wage penalty. In this paper we extend the 
previous literature by investigating the motherhood wage penalty in this unique institutional 
environment and form policy recommendations. 
We explore the motherhood wage penalty after controlling for various human capital 
characteristics and selection into the labor market to arrive at the estimates of the motherhood 
wage penalty comparable to those from other countries/studies. Constructing the panel data 
from the Ukrainian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (ULMS)4 for the period 1997-2007 and 
estimating the fixed-effect model, we find the overall motherhood wage penalty of 
approximately 19%. Females with only one child earn 17% less than females without 
children, and females with two or more children earn 29% less per hour. Our analysis reveals 
heterogeneity in the estimates across educational groups and depending on the age at first 
birth. Women with higher education suffer the lowest motherhood wage penalty compared to 
those with lower levels of education (11% vs. 18% per child). There is no evidence of benefit 
in postponing the age at first birth. On the contrary, delaying first birth until the mother is 
aged 30 and above is associated with the highest motherhood wage penalty, but only among 
those with the lowest levels of education. In addition, the motherhood wage penalty is highest 
for those who are not married. 
The magnitude of the overall motherhood wage penalty falls short of the estimate of 
33% for Germany, which also has generous family policies and low cultural support for 
maternal employment. In fact, it lies within the range of the moderate motherhood wage 
penalty between 16% for Spain and 21% for Ireland (Budig, Misra, and Boeckmann 2012), 
which exhibit high cultural support for maternal employment. This suggests that poor legal 
environment and high cultural support of grand-parenting (combined with low retirement age) 
keep the motherhood wage penalty at bay.  
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However, there is an indication that this may change in the near future. After the 
Revolution of Dignity,5 the country is finally on its way to establish credible institutions ± 
first and foremost this relates to the legal system working towards enforcement of existing 
legislation. Therefore, we shall expect an increase in the motherhood wage penalty due to this 
factor. This pressure will be reinforced by the Pensions reform through a gradual increase in 
the retirement age, which would limit availability of grandparents for care provision. Hence, 
countermeasures should be devised in time to balance off such unintended consequences of 
these much-needed reforms targeting the dire demographic situation. We recommend two 
options: investment in quality and increased availability of public childcare centers and/or 
creation of favorable conditions for private initiatives in this sector, as well as information 
campaigns which promote positive attitudes towards maternal employment. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview 
of the previous literature concerning the motherhood wage penalty. Section 3 describes family 
policies, cultural norms and de facto employment practices in Ukraine. The underlying 
methodology is presented in Section 4 followed by a description of the data in Section 5. 
Estimation results as well as econometric issues pertinent to the current analysis are discussed 
in Section 6, while Section 7 offers conclusions and policy recommendations. 
2 Literature Review  
Economists relate labor market consequences of motherhood to re-allocation of time, 
lower investment in human capital, deterioration of human capital due to career interruptions, 
changes in productivity and work effort, changes in preferences for specific job amenities, 
and taste/statistical discrimination largely relying on theories of time allocation (Becker 
1965), human capital (Mincer 1958), and taste (Becker 1957) and statistical discrimination 
(Phelps 1972). These theories are complementary and difficult to distinguish empirically. In 
spite of this, a whole set of empirical literature has developed, focusing on the direct impact 
of children on female wages after controlling for various human capital characteristics ± 
leaving only explanations related to productivity, preferences, and discrimination. This 
empirical literature is vast ± Table 1 summarizes some of the studies.  
                                                          
5 The Ukrainian revolution of February 2014 (also known as the Euromaidan Revolution or Revolution of Dignity 
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The motherhood wage penalty is found in the USA (Anderson, Binder and Krause 2002, 
2003, Baum 2002, Budig and England 2001, Loughran and Zissimopoulos 2009, Gangl and 
Ziefle 2009, Miller 2011, Taniguchi 1999, Waldfogel 1997; 1998), in Britain (Waldfogel 
1995, 1998a, Viitanen 2004), Canada (Drolet 2002), Germany (Buligescu et al. 2009), 
Australia (Livermore, Rodgers and Siminski 2011),  and France (Davies and Pierre 2005, 
Meurs et al. 2010). The estimates range from two per cent (Baum 2002; Loughran and 
Zissimopoulos 2009) to nine per cent (Waldfogel 1995, 1998) per child. Some studies observe 
rather high (up to 20%) wage penalty per child (Kunze and Ejrnaes 2004). However, studies 
in Denmark (Gupta and Smith 2001, Simonsen and Skipper 2006; 2012) and Sweden 
(Albrecht et al. 1999) find that motherhood has little or no direct effect on wages. Generous 
parental leave programs and powerful labor unions are thought to be related to such findings. 
For example, in Sweden mothers are paid up to 85% of their salary during maternity leave.  
Some researchers have undertaken cross-country comparisons of motherhood wage 
penalties. Analyzing surveys (1999 ± 2000) for eight industrialized countries, Sigle-Rushton 
and Waldfogel (2007) conclude that mothers in Nordic Countries (Norway, Finland, Sweden) 
at age 45 earn 82-89% of what non-mothers earn. At another extreme, earnings of mothers in 
the Netherlands and Germany amount to 56-74 % of non-PRWKHUV¶The United Kingdom is 
closer to Continental Europe, with 67-75 % of non-mothers¶earnings, while other Anglo-
American countries, USA and Canada, are more similar to Nordic countries at 81-89%. 
Abendroth et al. (2014), using data from 13 European countries (1994-2001), find that women 
in the countries with higher public expenditures on childcare experience a lower motherhood 
wage penalty because childcare availability makes women less likely to switch to more 
flexible but lower-paid jobs following motherhood. 
Ideally, one would want to separate discrimination from other, more ³legitimate´, 
reasons for differences in wages, such as decrease in productivity due to the effort allocation 
and change in preferences. However, the few attempts to do this are neither conclusive nor 
generalizable to the general population. Empirical testing of the effort allocation hypothesis 
is rather difficult due to the lack of cases when productivity can be directly measured. In 
professional sports, however, earnings are determined by performance: that is, by 
productivity. Kalist¶V (2008) study of The Ladies Professional Golf Association shows that, 
indeed, productivity of women starts falling as soon as they become mothers. On the contrary, 
no significant difference is found between mothers and non-mothers in academia in terms of 





In addition to the listed explanations, mothers may search for jobs with special 
amenities, and therefore may agree to lower wages. The study by Kalleberg et al. (2003) 
shows that mothers are more likely to end up in part-time and temporary jobs that offer lower 
wages and no pensions and health insurance. Moreover, part-time employment was found to 
be a major determinant of lower wages among mothers in the US (Budig and England 2001) 
and in the UK (Joshi et al. 1999). Felfe (2012) states that the motherhood wage penalty may 
be explained by adjustments in the work schedule following motherhood, such as a change in 
number of hours worked, switching to a more flexible schedule or to the jobs with lower levels 
of stress. Waldfogel (1998) and Phipps et al. (2001) illustrate that those women who do not 
change employer after becoming a mother experience a lower motherhood wage penalty.  
With a global upward trend in the age at first birth, researchers started investigating 
the impact of delaying birth on human capital accumulation and wages. Pregnancy in young 
years lowers investment in education (Fletcher and Wolfe 2008, Lang and Ashcraft 2013) and 
experience. Mature motherhood, while having a less severe impact on education (Blackburn, 
Bloom and Neumark 1990), still leads to shorter work experience. Therefore, career 
interruptions for females who have accumulated sufficient work experience before becoming 
mothers imply higher opportunity cost of time out of the labor market (Anderson, Binder and 
Krause 2002). Miller (2011) finds that each additional year of motherhood delay is associated 
with a 9% increase in earnings per year of delay. Amuedo-Dorantes and Kimmel (2005) 
investigate the importance of education and delaying childbirth in the US and find that 
college-educated women who delayed motherhood beyond 30 earned 21% more than non-
mothers. 
Performance of mothers in labor markets in the CIS countries has not received enough 
attention so far. Only few tangentially relevant estimates are available. Gerry, Kim and Li 
(2004) examine the gender wage gap in Russia using the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring 
Survey and find 27% average gender wage differential for the period 1994-1996. However, 
the gap became wider after the financial crisis of 1998. The difference in wages of mothers 
and childless women in Russia comprised nearly 8% (Arzhenovskiy and Artamonova 2007) 
in the year 2003 to2005. Another Ukrainian neighbor, Poland, is shown to be the only country 
in the European Union without gender wage differential (O'Dorchai 2008). The same study 
illustrates the motherhood wage penalty in several other countries: it ranges from 1% in 
Poland, Greece and Hungary to 12% in Estonia. We are not aware of a single paper on the 





in 1991 and fell to 34% in 2003 (Ganguli and Terrell 2005). This finding indicates potentially 
high motherhood wage penalty as the differential is averaged across all women: mothers and 
childless women. 
Not surprisingly, such a wide range of estimates for the motherhood wage penalty 
across countries and time periods provoked further investigation of the factors explaining 
such a variation. Most recent literature has focused on family policies introduced in most 
industrialized countries over the course of 20th century, finding support for the hypothesis that 
the cost of generous maternity protection policies is passed onto women through lower wages 
(Ruhm 1998, Gangl and Ziefle 2009). Budig, Misra, and Boeckmann (2012) conclude that 
family policies reduce the motherhood wage penalty when combined with cultural norms 
supporting maternal employment. But when the cultural support for maternal employment is 
low, such policies may lead to higher motherhood wage penalties. 
This paper contributes to the literature in three ways. First, it is the first study to 
produce the estimates of the motherhood wage penalty for one of the largest post-Socialist 
countries, which is comparable to the estimates for other countries. Second, we investigate 
the role of education and postponement of fertility decisions in reducing the motherhood wage 
penalty ± crucial for informing policy makers in their search for measures to tackle the 
continuing population decline and lowest low fertility in the country facing depopulation. 
Third, by placing these estimates into the context of existing institutions and cultural norms 
and comparing the evidence to other countries, we are challenging earlier findings and raising 
questions for further research on the impact of institutions and cultural norms on the 
motherhood wage penalty. 
3 Formal and informal institutions affecting fertility in Ukraine 
To set the stage for an informed discussion of the findings, in this section we offer a 
description of the relevant policies in Ukraine and review the evidence on cultural norms and 
existing practices in labor markets with respect to women, and mothers in particular. While a 
formal consideration of the family-related and anti-discrimination policies in Ukraine shows 
an advanced state of affairs suggesting family-friendly workplaces, the situation in reality is 
far removed from what it is on paper.  Discriminatory employment practices combined with 
negative attitudes towards maternal employment in an environment where childcare is cheap 





offering the protection of declared rights, put women into an extremely vulnerable position 
when trying to combine career and family. 
3.1 Labor Market Policies.  
The Labor Code of Ukraine originates from the Soviet Labor Code adopted in 1971, 
which was based on the idea of workers being D³ZHDNHUSDUW\´ and, thus, requiring greater 
protection by the state. De jure, the Labor Code, along with a number of the ILO Conventions 
ratified by the country and various Cabinet of Ministers¶ labor regulations, declare many 
employee protections not common in the market economies governing wages, leave, the right 
to collective bargaining, and termination of employment, among others. Although the Labor 
Code awaits replacement in order to combine all the labor market regulations in one place 
and fulfill EU requirements, the current combination of regulations establishes the legal 
equality of men and women, including equal pay for equal work. Moreover, the current Labor 
Code contains a whole chapter on special treatment of women, such as prohibiting work in 
some dangerous and harmful occupations, forbidding pregnant women and women with small 
children (under age 3) from working at night, overtime and on weekends, as well as regulating 
leave of absences related to pregnancy, childbirth and child caring (Ganguli and Terrell 2009). 
Prior to 1991, working mothers were able to use paid leave due to pregnancy and 
childbirth for as many as 112 calendar days. Females who gave birth to two or more children 
or experienced complications were entitled to 126 days of paid leave. Employers were to pay 
100% of an average monthly wage during this time interval. Voluntary leave for up to one 
year was possible only for those who had working experience of more than one year, and 
during this period mothers could get only partial compensation. In the independent Ukraine, 
fully compensated periods were prolonged to 126 and 140 days respectively. However, 
responsibility for paying maternal leave compensation was shifted to the Fund for Social 
Protection, contributions to which are paid via the social insurance system as part of payroll 
tax. But that also meant that only insured women were eligible. Voluntary leave was extended 
to two years in 1991, and since 1998 this period has been fixed at three years with partial 





3.2 Baby Bonus policy 
In spite of the complexity of the fertility decision mechanisms, the one and only pro-
natalist policy pursued by the Ukrainian government has been the so-called baby bonus.6 This 
bonus over the course of 1990s had been set at an extremely low level, but has been increased 
several times to a considerable degree over the course of 2000s. Table A.1 shows the 
evolution of this policy. From 2008, the amount of the baby bonus increased for each 
subsequent child. In 2014, the government changed the approach, and now the amount of the 
baby bonus does not depend on the birth order. Now new mothers are entitled to a bonus of 
UAH 41,280 (USD 1720). The first payment is currently UAH 10,320 (USD 430) while the 
rest is paid in equal monthly installments over the period of three years. 
3.3 Cultural norms with respect to maternal employment.  
Among European countries, Ukraine has one of the highest proportion of people 
strongly disapproving of women with children younger than 3 years old working full time. 
$FFRUGLQJ WR WKH $QDO\WLFDO 5HVHDUFK RQ :RPHQ¶V 3DUWLFLSDWLRQ LQ WKH /DERU )RUFH LQ
Ukraine, 25% of Ukrainians share such view.7 The stereotype that women¶Vprimary role is 
motherhood and therefore they should "sacrifice" their professional and career interests for 
the sake of the child is more common in Ukraine compared to other European countries. At 
the same time, less than 4% of Ukrainians do not approve of fathers with children under three 
years old working full time, while the proportion of people who completely approve of this is 
one of the highest among European countries (over 40%).  This emphasizes the cultural 
perceptionVDERXWWKH³DSSURSULDWH´PRGHORIDIDPLO\LQZKLFKDPDQDQGDZRPDQKDYH
different roles based on gender. The evidence from the World Values Survey reveals that 
8NUDLQLDQVEHOLHYHWKDWWKHZRPDQ¶VUROHLVDWKRPH Figure 3 shows that more than a half of 
Ukrainians DJUHHRUVWURQJO\DJUHHZLWKWKHVWDWHPHQW³%HLQJDKRXVHZLIHLVMXVWDVIXOILOOLQJ
DVZRUNLQJIRUSD\´ Moreover, Figure 4 suggests that around 35% of Ukrainians agree with 
the statement that children suffer when their mother works. 
 Not only the perception of working mothers in society but also the availability of 
alternative childcare arrangements influence the possibilities for combining work and family. 
According to Jappens and Bavel (2012), grandparents are the vital part of informal childcare 
arrangements in Europe. It is particularly the case in Eastern Europe, where the family norms 
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include mutual exchange of support between parents and children who live in separate 
households. Besides, according to Ukrainian legislation, the mother, father, grandmother, 
grandfather or other family member have a right to take child care leave until the child turns 
three years old. Intensive involvement of grandparents decreases the cost of employment for 
women, although it may restrict employment to part-time due to the inability of grandparents 
to provide full-time childcare. Results from a relatively recent survey confirm heavy 
involvement of the older generation in providing childcare in Ukraine: only 23.4% of families 
reported no support with childcare from grand-parents, whilst almost 38% reported 
substantial support (IDSS 2009). 
3.4 Government childcare system in Ukraine 
Preschool education in Ukraine is included in the state educational system and is the 
responsibility of the Ministry of Education. The two major types of preschool facilities are 
nursery schools (dytyachi yasla), which care for infants from six weeks to three years old, and 
kindergartens (dytyachi sadki), which are intended for children from three to six years of age. 
Provision of publicly subsidized childcare may not be as effective in Ukraine as in other 
countries. Although state childcare facilities are relatively cheap (according to the Ukrainian 
6WDWLVWLFV$JHQF\WKHVHH[SHQVHVDUHUHSRUWHGDVSDUWRIWKH³(GXFDWLRQ´FDWHJRU\DQGRYHU
2002-2014 families spent on it on average 1.1-1.3% of the household budget8), it is of lower 
quality. In the USSR time, the majority of the child-care facilities belonged to particular 
enterprises. The bankruptcy or poor financial state of these enterprises during early years 
caused a significant decrease in the number of available childcare facilities. Currently, there 
is a documented shortage of childcare places: about 30 children are put on a waiting list per 
100 admitted (Sologoub, 2013). 
3.5 Existing employment practices in Ukraine: Treatment of Mothers in 
Labor Markets 
Despite the existence of family-friendly national labor policies and antidiscrimination 
laws, there is some evidence of discrimination practices in the Ukrainian labor market. 
Although most of these facts are based on qualitative research or case studies, they might 
further enhance understanding of the magnitude of the motherhood wage penalty in Ukraine. 
 
                                                          





Hiring practices. According to the Labor Code, employers are not allowed to mention 
characteristics not related to the professional skills and competencies of potential employees 
in a job advertisement. However, the content analysis of most popular hiring websites shows 
that employers violate this regulation. For example, one financial company is looking for 
³+5-GLUHFWRU PHQ XQGHU ´ ZKLOH DQRWKHU FRPSDQ\ LV ORRNLQJ IRU ³ZRPHQ RI DJH 
RQZDUGVIRUWKHDGPLQLVWUDWLYHZRUN´.9 
Contracts. HR specialists argue that some employers have a clause in the labor 
contract that obliges women not to get married or/and pregnant during first two or three years 
of employment. If she does, she is liable to face monetary penalties. For example, according 
to the State Labor Inspection conducted in October 2012 (audit of 2500 firms), more than 900 
labor law violations were documented. Most of them related to the delayed payment of 
childcare benefits to female employees, involvement of pregnant women and women with 
children under 3 years in the types of work prohibited by law, and non-payment of sick 
leave.10 
Poor enforcement of the Labor Code. Although the Labor Code prohibits layoffs of 
pregnant women and women with small children, human rights activists claim that the lack 
of effective sanctions for the violation of these rules "unleashes" employers.11 The basic anti-
discrimination legislation in Ukraine was passed in 2010, but the State Program on Equal 
Rights of Men and Women was approved only in 2013.12 Delayed approval of the Program, 
along with the 2010 Administration reform, prevented the implementation of the basic anti-
discrimination law.13   
Pregnancy tax. Extensive motherhood benefits in Ukraine may actually work against 
mothers, OHDGLQJWR³SRVLWLYHGLVFULPLQDWLRQ´(LQKRUQ2QHH[DPSOHLVWKHQHZ
Law ³On Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of Ukraine regarding Pensions´. 
According to this law, maternity leave is now included in the insurance period and therefore 
the employer is required to pay a new tax to the Pension Fund for each employee on maternity 
leave. This tax, which accounts for 33% of salary, will discourage employers from hiring 
                                                          
9 http://tyzhden.ua/Society/78512.  
10 http://helsinki.org.ua/index.php?id=1362661718#_ftn34  
11 http://helsinki.org.ua/index.php?id=1398060713  
12 http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/717-2013-%D0%BF  





pregnant women and potential mothers. And in cases where they are hired, women will most 
likely only be paid the minimum wage.14 
4 Methodology 
As is conventional in the motherhood wage penalty literature, we start with female 
wages determined by the human capital model: 
 itiitit uvCW  ȕXitGE0ln   , 
 (1) 
where itW  is hourly wage rate of an individual i in year t, itC  is a set of variables describing a 
ZRPDQ¶VPRWKHUKRRGe.g. ever mother, number of children, one child, two or more children, 
number of children in different age categories), itX  - vector of explanatory variables, iv  - 
individual specific time invariant unobserved characteristics (ability, morbidity, etc.) and itu  
- idiosyncratic error. Following the previous literature, explanatory variables include mother 
specific characteristics that have an impact on her labor market outcomesVXFKDVPRWKHU¶V
education, marital status, age, and actual experience.15 In addition, we explore the impact of 
firm-specific characteristics, such as size and ownership of thHILUPDVZHOODVZRPHQ¶VSDUW-
time job status, and share of experience in large firms. 
We estimate Equation (1) by fixed effects, which has a number of desirable statistical 
LPSOLFDWLRQVLQ WKHDQDO\VLVRIWKHLPSDFWRI WKHHYHQWRIPRWKHUKRRGRQZRPHQ¶Vwages. 
Explicitly dealing with the person-level error ensures that the impact of unobserved time-
constant factors DIIHFWLQJZRPHQ¶VZDJHs (such as ethnicity, early labor market and family 
experiences, as well as temporally stable attitudes and preferences) are accounted for by the 
model. In removing all time-constant differences between women, the fixed-effects (FE) 
estimator effectively identifies the effect of interest from within variation exclusively. In other 
words, it produces the estimate of the effect of a change in the number of children on the 
IROORZLQJFKDQJHLQZRPHQ¶VZDJH. Furthermore, the FE estimator also permits a correlation 
                                                          
14 http://www.unian.ua/society/817662-zmi-noviy-podatok-na-vagitnist-uskladniv-stanovische-jinok-na-
roboti-video.html 
15 We have also originally included tenure and time out of the labor market. However, because of our preferred fixed 






between the person-level error, iv , and observed covariates (Wooldridge 2002) as, on the 
contrary to the random effects estimator, it completely eliminated this error component. This 
addresses our concerns for potential selection of women into motherhood by any unobserved, 
but economically relevant, characteristics. 
As we are dealing with the sample of working women only, we have to address the 
issue of self-selection into the labor market. The traditional approach to correct for self-
selectivity bias due to not observing information about wages of non-working women is the 
Heckman sample selection model +HFNPDQ7KHLGHDLVWRLQFOXGHWKHLQYHUVH0LOO¶V
ratio as an additional explanatory variable into the UHJUHVVLRQ 7KH LQYHUVH 0LOO¶V UDWLR LV
FRPSXWHGEDVHGRQWKHSURELWUHJUHVVLRQRIWKHSUREDELOLW\RIZRPHQ¶VSDUWLFLSDWLRQLQWKH
labor force: 
iith 22 HE c itZ ,        
 (2) 
where ih  is an indicator equal to one if a woman is employed and zero otherwise. To 
test if sample selection bias exists, the relationship between the residuals for the two equations 
(1) and (2) should be examined. If the unobservables in the employment status regression 
model are correlated with the unobservables in the wage regression, then the estimates of the 
wage equation without correction would be biased. 
In many applications, sample selection and individual specific unobserved 
heterogeneity issues occur simultaneously. Some estimators have been proposed which deal 
with both sources of estimation bias, producing consistent results under different assumptions. 
Wooldridge (1995) proposes an estimator that requires specifying the functional form of the 
conditional mean of the individual effects in the equation of interest. The other two estimators 
impose some distributional assumptions on the error terms (Rochina-Barrachina 1999) and 
the fixed effects (Kyriazidou 1997) in the equation of interest. Dustmann and Rochina-
Barrachina (2000) apply the three methods mentioned above to the estimation of the wage 
equation for female labor market participants, verifying the impact of actual labor market 
experience on wages. The authors also offer extensions of these estimators to address other 
econometric problems, such as non-strict exogeneity and/or time constant non-linear errors 
in variables. Given data availability, we use the estimation procedure proposed by 





effect probit model, where  iiti ZZZ , . TKHQWKHLQYHUVH0LOO¶VUDWLRLVDGGHGWRWKHIL[HG
effect estimation using a selected sample of employed women. 
One of the major concerns in most studies of the effect of children on labor market 
outcomes for mothers is endogeneity of such explanatory variables as marriage, motherhood, 
experience and tenure in the wage equation. Korenman and Neumark (1990) explore these 
econometric issues in a cross-sectional analysis of marriage, motherhood and earnings. They 
perform their analysis using 1968 National Longitudinal Surveys. Their main findings are 
that the OLS estimator is biased mainly because of the unobserved individual specific 
heterogeneity, and they find evidence that experience and tenure are endogenous while 
marital status and number of children are exogenous in the wage equation. Moreover, in their 
research standard sample-selection estimation shows no evidence of selection into labor 
market bias. They find a 7% wage decrease for one child and 22% for two or more children. 
The authors suggest that family background variables such as parents¶ RFFXSDWLRQ DQG
parents¶\HDUVRI education or level of education of the mother can be used as instruments for 
experience and tenure in a cross-sectional setting. 
Taking into account the above considerations we would, like to compare the estimates 
from the following models: (i) Pooled OLS, (ii) OLS corrected for selectivity into labor 
market, (iii) FE estimation, and (iv) FE estimation corrected for selectivity into labor market. 
For the selection equation, we include a dummy variable of whether the woman has an infant 
child, so ),( itititZ IX . Controlling for the number of children, this should have no effect 
on the wages, but has a substantial effect on the labor force participation decision. 
In addition, as suggested by the literature, we will explore the heterogeneity of the 
motherhood wage penalty along the following dimensions: education, age at first birth, ILUPV¶
characteristics, and marital status. 
 
5 Data 
For the investigation of the impact of childbearing RQ PRWKHUV¶ ODERU market 
performance in Ukraine we analyze panel data from the Ukrainian Longitudinal Monitoring 
Survey (ULMS). The sample consists of three waves of the ULMS, which is a nationally 
representative sample of Ukrainian households in 2003, 2004 and 2007. The first wave of the 





ULMS household questionnaire contains information about the structure of the household, 
housing conditions, household assets, income and expenditure. The ULMS individual 
questionnaire contains information on individual characteristics of household members, 
individuals¶PDLQDQGDGGLWLRQDOMREVQRQ-employment periods, main and secondary jobs in 
a reference week, unemployment and job search in the reference week, education and skills, 
changes in residence, attitudes, health and ecology. Additionally, the 2003 ULMS individual 
questionnaire contains retrospective data on job characteristics in 1986, the year of Chornobyl 
catastrophe; 1991, the year in which Ukraine became independent; and for the period from 
1997 to 2003. Information about the main job has been taken from both retrospective and 
reference week sections.  
5.1 Sample construction 
Using both the reference week data and the retrospective information, we construct a 
panel data over the period from 1997 to 2007, and restrict it to female respondents aged 
between 15 and 65 in 2003. There are three important concerns which led us to the exclusion 
of earlier years from the retrospective data. Firstly, there is an issue of the survival bias, 
because the data for 1986 and 1991 has been obtained from the retrospective section of 2003 
questionnaire. It means that samples for these years are not representative due to the absence 
of older people. In some other studies using the ULMS data set, authors weighted the 1986 
and 1991 samples using weights for 2003 and the information on the age and gender structure 
from 1987 and 1991 Statistical Yearbooks of the USSR (Gorodnichenko and Sabirianova 
2004, Ganguli and Terrel 2005). Second, 1986 wages are reported in USSR roubles, and 1991 
wages in coupons, which need to be translated to real terms, of course. There is rather precise 
information about inflation for the years 1997-2004,16 while inflation for 1986, 1991 and 2004 
is hard to measure correctly. Moreover, the basket of goods and services for the calculation 
of the CPI changed several times during this period. Finally, and most importantly, this is 
related to the accuracy of the construction of our variables of interest ± number of children, 
which will be discussed in more detail further.  
The data set contains information on WKH SHUVRQ¶V job characteristics17 as well as 
contractual monthly wages in December of every year, except for the interview years when 
                                                          
16 Consumers Price Index (CPI) available from the State Statistical Committee of Ukraine (http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua) will 
be used as a measure of inflation. 
17
 We use information on main job only, because the labor market history does not go back to 1986 for secondary jobs. 
However, as we are focusing on the hourly wage rate, the number of jobs (even if different between mothers and non-





the information is taken from the reference week. Thus we chose December as our reference 
time for the construction of the pseudo-panel. In addition, we have full employment history, 
starting from 1986, which is used in constructing actual work experience in months, and time 
out of the labor market, and a set of job- and firm-specific characteristics. We also know when 
the first job started, and the start month and year of the job which the person held in 1986. 
Thus our measure of experience is bound to a measurement error due to labor market 
interruptions for those people who were out of the labor market between their first job and 
the job they held in 1986, and for those who were not employed in 1986 for the time prior to 
the start of this non-employment spell. However, there are two reasons why we think that this 
limitation has minor consequences for our analysis. First, due to peculiarities of the 
organization of labor in the Soviet Union, non-employment spells are unlikely to be common 
prior to 1986, even prior to 1991. Second, as we rely on the fixed effect approach, our 
estimates are based on the variation within the sample period, i.e. year to year changes in 
experience after the start of the sample in 1997, with all the prior differences being irrelevant. 
The ULMS data set allows constructing a data set for females that contains 53,119 
person-year observations, 44,564 of which are of working age (15-65 years old). For 42,647 
of them we have work status available, and only 17,221 person-year observations are for 
employed women with reported wages. The final pooled data set contains 15,656 
observations, which is approximately 1,423 observations per year. 
Hourly wages. We use nominal monthly contractual wages in December of every 
year, except for the interview years, and current contractual monthly wage in the interview 
month, currency in which wages were paid with the corresponding exchange rates, and the 
CPI to convert all wages to real monthly wages expressed in UAH. Hours worked are derived 
from the employment history where people were asked whether they worked always full-time, 
always part-time, or a combination of the two. In the first two cases, we have the actual 
number of working hours per week over the entire work spell. For the latter, we have three 
periods of part-time work, so we are able to populate corresponding periods with appropriate 
working hours. To avoid a division bias, we follow the procedure suggested by Kimmel and 
Kniesner (1998): real monthly wage is divided by 40 if a person reports that she works not 
less than 25 hours per week and divided by 20 if she works less than 25 hours per week. The 





Children. ULMS does not have explicit retrospective information on children. As the 
fertility history questions are poorly defined in the survey,18 we construct our children-related 
variables from the household roster. Of course, it does have some limitations. For example, 
we are bound to assume that the biological child living with the mother in 2003, 2004, and 
2007 has lived with her all the time since birth. On the other hand, if a woman does not have 
a child living with her at the time of the interview, she will be treated as a non-mother. Given 
that we are less likely to have children older than 18 present in the household at the time of 
interview and the fact that the motherhood wage penalty dissipates over time (Viitanen 2014, 
et al. 2014), we restrict our measures to children 0-18 years old. Yet this approach has 
important advantages given the question we are aiming to answer: if the woman does not have 
children living with her in the same household, there is no reasonable explanation on why the 
motherhood wage penalty could manifest itself. 
5.2 Sample Description  
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for females for the first and last year of the 
sample and for the pooled data. Comparing 1997 to 2007 data shows that the proportion of 
employed women has not changed much, while the share of those married increased from 
58% to 63%. Likewise, the real wage has grown from UAH 383 at the beginning of the sample 
period to UAH 800 at the end.  
Focusing on the characteristics of the pooled sample in Columns (5)-(6) reveals the 
following. Approximately 47% of females in the sample do not have children,19 33% have 
only one child, 18% have two children, and only 3% have more than two children. Employed 
women account for 53% of the entire sample, have on average more children and are more 
likely to be married compared to the whole sample. The latter may be explained by the fact 
that employed females are usually older than the rest of the sample. Employed women are 
also better educated: while high school, professional and higher education groups constitute 
40%, 45% and 15% of the whole sample, respectively, the shares of the two latter categories 
are much higher for employed females (53% for women with a professional and 22% for 
women with a higher level of education). We also find that the average wage is UAH 428 
measured in constant 2007 prices. 
                                                          
18 We do not know whether the child whom the woman gave birth to is still alive, and if not, when (s)he died (this 
information is only explicitly asked for children born in 2005-2007, but not prior). 
19 Through all this paper a child is a person aged between 0 and 18 years old who lived in the household with a particular 





Table 3 allows for the comparison along two dimensions: employment and 
motherhood status. Although there are more current mothers among employed (53% in the 
whole sample vs. 67% among employed), there is neither a significant difference nor a 
specific pattern in the number of children (both overall and by age groups) and age at first 
birth among working mothers (Columns (3)-(4)). The average age at first birth is 22-23 years 
and is the same for mothers and non-mothers. The reason why non-mothers have non-missing 
age at first birth is that we define mother as a woman who has children of age 0-18 in the 
current period. Therefore, non-mothers include both childless women as well as women with 
children older than 18 years. Comparing information on mothers and non-mothers in the 
sample of employed women (Column (4) vs. Column (6) in Table 3) shows that mothers are 
on average older, slightly better educated, 25% more likely to be married, and have on average 
two more years of experience. With respect to the monthly wage rate, it is lower for mothers 
(UAH 412) than for non-mothers (UAH 460), while both groups on average work the same 
number of hours. In terms of hourly wages ± our dependent variable ± mothers earn slightly 
less than non-mothers (2.45 vs. 2.70 per hour), but the difference is statistically significant.  
Although the descriptive analysis does show some evidence for the differential hourly 
wage rate between mothers and non-mothers, this is just a crude comparison. Controlling for 
various demographic and human capital characteristics, as well as taking care of the 
unobserved heterogeneity and sample selection, may reveal a completely different 
relationship. The next sections presents the results from the multivariate analysis of the 
relationship between motherhood and wages. 
6 Results 
6.1 Estimation of the motherhood wage penalty 
Estimates from the basic model for working age females (15-65 years old) are shown 
in Table 4. Explanatory variables of interest are dummy variables for number of children (0-
18 years old) in the household. Mothers with no children 0-18 years old are treated as controls 
(omitted category). The estimated motherhood wage penalty from the pooled OLS regression 
(Column 1) is 7.8% for those women who have one child and 12% for those with two or more 
children. As expected, there is a positive, albeit decreasing, effect of age and actual 
experience. Comparing vocational/professional training (2-3 year) to university education (5-
6 years), the former brings much smaller returns per year of study: ~4% compared to ~7%. 





are divorced/widowed/separated, but those who have never been married enjoy an 11% 
premium in wages. 
The sample we use includes only those individuals for which we observe wages, i.e. 
employed individuals, which might produce biased results (Heckman 1979). For example, a 
woman who is less productive in the job market, but more productive in the household, will 
face lower wages and will be more likely to have more children. So these women choose not 
to work. Not taking them into account may lead to underestimation of the motherhood wage 
penalty (find it being less negative). Column (2) presents the second stage results from the 
Heckman Selection procedure. The Inverse Mills Ratio comes from the first stage based on 
the probit regression of female participation in the labor market with the same explanatory 
variables as in the OLS regression, plus a dummy for the presence of an infant in the family 
(Verbeek 2008). After adding the inverse Mills ratio into the pooled OLS regression, the 
estimated effect of children almost does not change. Moreover, the coefficient of inverse Mills 
ratio is insignificant. That means that there is no evidence of a sample selection bias, which 
is consistent with the findings in Gupta and Smith (2001), Waldfogel (1998), and Korenman 
and Newmark (1990) for the cross-sectional settings. 
Heterogeneity bias. The OLS and Heckman Selection Procedure allow controlling 
only for observable characteristics, while there might be individual specific time invariant 
unobserved characteristics (such as ability, work-related preferences, willingness to work, 
etc.) that also have an impact on IHPDOHV¶ wages. As a result, the OLS estimates may be biased 
because of other omitted variables. We exploit the panel nature of the data and turn to the 
fixed effects procedure to account for the time invariant unobserved individual heterogeneity. 
Results from this regression are provided in Column (3). The coefficients on variables of 
interests are of the expected signs and statistically significant. The negative effect of having 
one child is almost 16%, and that of two or more children is 27%. With respect to human 
capital characteristics, returns on education are estimated to be of 31% for higher education 
and 12% for vocational/professional education, which brings them to approximately the same 
6% per year of studies. The effect of marital status variables becomes much smaller and 
jointly insignificant. The formal F-test suggests that the null of whether all unobserved 
individual specific variables equal to zero is rejected (F(2855, 12789)=8.48, Prob>F=0.0000). 





we have run a formal Hausman model specification test of fixed effects versus random effects, 
which has suggested that random effects is not appropriate (chi-sq statistics = 2530.92).20 
Heterogeneity bias and selection into labor force. Although the test with the 
OLS model has provided no evidence of selection bias, this may be different in the panel 
setting. Therefore, we apply a sample selection correction procedure to the fixed effects 
estimator (Wooldridge 2002, Chapter 17.7) in order to address the issue of the bias associated 
with self-selection into labor market controlling for unobserved individual heterogeneity. 
Column (4) of Table 4 presents results from the fixed effect estimation with an additional 
term ± ³ODPEGD´,QYHUVH0LOOVRatio). IMR is estimated from &KDPEHUODLQ¶VUDQGRPHIIHFW
probit model, with the same explanatory variables as in the fixed effect regression adding 
dummy variable for the presence of infant in the family and all averages (within individual) 
of all variablHVLQYROYHG7KHFRHIILFLHQWRI³ODPEGD´LVSRVLWLYHand significant, which means 
that there is a positive selection bias in fixed effects estimation of log wage equation. From 
this model, if a woman has only one child 0-18 years old living with her, she has 17% lower 
wages after controlling for the human capital characteristics and labor market experience, 
while having two or more children has doubled the effect to 30%. However, one has to bear 
in mind that the average number of children in the sample of employed mothers is 1.44, which 
means that the high 30% estimate should be treated with caution, although this is still within 
the range of previous estimates from 0 to 33% (Viitanen 2014). Since this specification allows 
for addressing both individual time-invariant heterogeneity as well as selection into the labor 
market, we will use it for further tests as a preferred specification.21 
Other tests. To explore heterogeneity of motherhood wage penalty along several 
other dimensions we run the preferred specification (as in Column (4)) including additional 
controls and interactions.  The full results from the analysis with firm-specific characteristics 
                                                          
20 Both fixed effect and first difference estimators address the problem of unobserved heterogeneity bias in case when 
this unobserved effect is correlated with one or more explanatory variable and both are asymptotically efficient but 
under different assumptions. First difference estimator is the most efficient under the assumption that error term follows 
random walk, while fixed effect estimator is more efficient under the assumption of strict endogeneity of explanatory 
variables. In many cases, the truth is likely to be somewhere in between. The results of fixed effect and first difference 
estimation are found to be similar. 
21 Although Korenman and Neumark (1990) raise concerns about endogeneity of human capital characteristics, such as 
experience and tenure (Korenman and Neumark 1990), they refer to the cross-sectional setting and emphasize the role 
of the unobserved individual heterogeneity. Korenman and Neumark (1990) implement their research for the cross-
sectional data and suggest family background variables (occupation and education of parents, dummy of whether 
individual lived with parents at the age of 18, etc) as instruments. All proposed instruments are time invariant variables. 
Therefore they cannot be used for the panel data estimation. In the case of panel data, such family background variables 
ĂƐŚƵƐďĂŶĚ ?Ɛ/ƉĂƌƚŶĞƌ ?ƐǇĞĂƌƐŽĨĞĚƵĐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞ ?ĂŶĚƚĞŶƵƌĞĐĂŶďĞƵƐĞĚĂƐŝŶƐƚƌƵŵĞŶƚƐĨŽƌĨĞmale experience and 
tenure (Mroz, 1987). However, it restricts the sample to married females. In addition, in the ULMS data set information 
about partners is available only for half of married females, and the marital history part of the questionnaire after 2003 is 





are offered in Column (5) of Table 4, but the other specification will only be mentioned in 
this sub-section with the full set of results available upon request. 
First, adding firm-specific characteristics makes the estimated coefficients of interest 
slightly smaller (Column (5)). However, only an indicator of whether the woman works for 
either state, public enterprise, or a collective farm returns a statistically significant effect of 
approximately 12% lower wages. Neither the dummy for the part-time work nor for the size 
of the firm have statistically significant effects, although the direction of the effects is as 
expected.   
Second, we also explore a hypothesis that the motherhood wage penalty is different 
for women working at firms of different size and/or ownership. We found no differential 
impact of children on wages by firms¶FKDUDFWHULVWLFV+RZHYHUDGGLQJWKHLQWHUDFWLRQWHUPV
changed the significance of the main estimates, with women in small firms and 
state/public/collective ownership earning lower wages. 
 Being aware of the limitations of using children measures based on the information 
from the household roster, we have included the dummy for ever-giving birth to a child from 
the fertility history to separate women who gave birth but have not lived with the child from 
non-mothers. The results produced for the variables of interest turned out to be very close to 
the ones in the main specification. 
Finally, similar to Budig and England (2001), we examine whether the wage penalty 
for motherhood differs for married and non-married mothers. To test this, we include 
interaction of the number of children and an indicator for being married to the preferred 
specification. Contrary to Budig and England (2001), we find that married mothers experience 
lower motherhood wage penalty compared to non-married mothers. The latter may be 
explained by the fact that married women have a spouse to share parenting responsibilities 
with and, as a result, can be in a better position to combine work and family. Further analysis 
shows that this finding is driven by the effect of having two children or more, with no 
differential impact of marriage on the motherhood wage penalty for the only child. 
6.2 Various measures of children variables 
Panel A in Table 5 presents the results from the main specification using various 
measures of motherhood. Column (1) shows the average wage penalty for currently being a 





equal to 15% (Column 2). Column (3) provides the results for the coefficients of interest from 
the most preferred specification.  
Column (4) of Table 5 distinguishes the effects of children of different ages. As can 
be seen, the penalty grows with the age of the child: being almost twice as large per child of 
school age (7-18) as it is for the pre-school age children.22 
As mentioned before, the motherhood variables used in the main analysis are 
constructed from the household roster. Therefore, these variables suffer from the limitation 
of putting mothers whose children are older than 18 and/or are not living with them at the 
time of interview in the same control group with women who have never been mothers. To 
address this concern, we introduce a dummy variable for whether a woman has children older 
than 18 years. On the one hand, this helps us to better define the control group ± only non-
mothers. On the other hand, it allows us estimating the effect of having older children on 
wages. As shown in Panel B of Table 5, introduction of this variable has no sizeable effect on 
the coefficients of interest, while the impact of having older children is not statistically 
significant and is very small in magnitude.  
Earlier in the paper we mentioned that our approach produces estimates of the 
differential pay between mothers and non-mothers which can be consistent with both the 
productivity related explanation and that of statistical discrimination. Following Waldfogel 
(1997), we have restricted our sample to women aged 45 years or younger in 1997. The reason 
for doing this is to estimate the penalty for women of childbearing age only. Although we lost 
one third of the sample, the significance of all coefficients of interest is preserved, although 
the magnitude is smaller. In this sample, both treatment and control group are potential 
subjects of statistical discrimination. Therefore, the estimates of the wage gap between 
mothers and non-mothers should mostly be related to productivity and preferences, and less 
so to discrimination. Indeed, as can be seen in Panel C of Table 5, the estimated motherhood 
wage penalty from this sample is almost twice smaller than that in Panel A. Consequently, 
one may conclude that approximately half of the motherhood wage penalty is attributable to 
discrimination channels. 
                                                          
22 Being concerned with the fact that the presence of children in the sample is constructed from the retrospective part of 
the ULMS without formal information on the presence of the child in the household over the period from 1997 to 2003, 
we have performed a test focusing only on the two years of the ULMS data. Unfortunately, FE estimations have not 
resulted in any meaningful estimates mainly due to the fact that over the course of one year very few women have given 
birth to a child. Therefore, while acknowledging the weakness of our approach, this is the best a researcher can do to 





6.3 The motherhood wage penalty and education 
An interesting question that arises after investigation of the wage penalty for 
motherhood is whether this penalty is the same for all females. For example, Anderson, 
Binder, and Krauser (2002) find that mothers with college education have no wage penalty 
after controlling for time out of the labor force. The first row of Table 6 presents the results 
of the estimation of the motherhood wage penalty for subsamples of women with different 
levels of education, as suggested in the literature. Overall, we find a similar pattern with the 
lower motherhood wage penalty at higher levels of education. However, it does not disappear 
completely for women with a university degree. 
The largest wage penalty (18%) is for those females whose highest level of education 
is high school or lower. Since we control for the actual labor market experience, these results 
cannot be explained by the claim that leaving work does not impose high costs on low-skilled 
workers (Anderson, Binger and Krause 2002). For those females who have completed 
vocational/professional education (the largest share of the sample) the motherhood wage 
penalty is 17%, while females with at least bachelor¶V degree experience the smallest wage 
penalty at 11%. The difference between the motherhood wage penalty of those with higher 
education and those with the lower levels of education is statistically significant at the 10% 
level (cell with the grey background). These results are in line with Taniguchi (1999), who 
found that education significantly reduces the wage penalty for females with at least 12 years 
of education. 
6.4 The motherhood wage penalty and timing of first birth 
Blackburn, Bloom and Neumark (1990) suggest that a delayed first childbirth is 
associated with higher wages. They investigate Mincerian wage equation adding age-at-first-
birth variables as additional controls. However, age-at-first-birth variables are time invariant; 
therefore their effect can only be estimated using simple OLS, which does not take into 
account unobserved individual specific effects. Moreover, age at first birth is endogenous: 
females who earn higher wages tend to postpone first birth. Therefore, we use our preferred 
specification adding interaction terms with the dummy variables for the age at first birth as 
controls (Taniguchi 1999). The coefficients obtained give estimates of the wage differentials 






Age at first birth is drawn from the fertility history. To determine the age categories for 
the age at first birth, we explore the distributions, overall and across education categories, 
presented in Figure A1. They show that the crude birth rate in Ukraine has been the highest 
among 20-24 year olds. The other two prominent groups are 25-29 and 30-34. As Figure 2 
suggests, fertility within these age categories has been following different trends over the past 
23 years: decreasing crude birth rate among those age 15-19, and in a most dramatic way 
among those aged 20-24, while increasing among older women. 
Column (2) in Table 6 offers the results from the analysis of how the effect of children 
on wages differs depending on the age at first birth. The estimated wage penalty per child is 
in the region of 11-15% no matter what is the age at first birth, except for the older than 30 
category for which the motherhood wage penalty is the highest, at 23%, contrary to earlier 
findings in the literature. However, the only marginally significant difference is between the 
estimate for the number of children at the age at first birth 25-29 and that at the age at first 
birth of 30 and older. 
The differences are more pronounced when analyzed by educational groups (Columns 
(4), (6), and (8)). For example, females with high school education or lower experience a 40% 
motherhood wage penalty if they give first birth at the age of 30 or older, which is the highest 
wage penalty among the three educational groups. Women with bachelor degree or higher 
lose only 16%, while women with professional education face a 28% wage penalty. This 
finding shows that education does mitigate the motherhood wage penalty, but only for those 
who delay the first birth until age 30 or above. 
Within the groups of women who gave first birth at the same age interval, there is no 
statistically significant difference across educational categories, except for those who delay 
first birth till age 30 or above. In this group the motherhood wage penalty is more than twice 
smaller if a woman has higher education. 
To conclude, we do find heterogeneity of the motherhood wage penalty across 
educational categories and depending on the age at first birth. Also there is some evidence 
that education serves as a mitigating factor, and this is most pronounced among women who 
delay childbirth until age of 30 or above. However, delaying childbirth is not bringing extra 
benefits in terms of lower motherhood wage penalty for those with higher education, while 






7 Conclusions and Policy Recommendations 
Facing military confrontation with Russia and dire political and economic situation, 
new leaders of Ukraine may have no time to think about another genuine threat, which shows 
no signs of reversal in the nearest future: crisis in demographics and population health. 
Population decline (12% since Independence) combined with aging and health deterioration 
undermines any efforts to revive economic development by reducing the pool of the labor 
force and increasing the burden on the public sector budget because of elder-care 
obligations.23 One of the most prominent factors in this population decline is the low fertility, 
ZKLFKUHDFKHGWKH³ORZHVWORZ´OHYHOVRI1.1 in 2001. In spite of the complexity of the factors 
influencing fertility decisions, only the baby bonus is discussed in Ukrainian policy circles as 
a measure to address the issue of low fertility. In spite of enormous increases in the amount 
of the baby bonus in the period from 2005 to 2013, there is little evidence that this has led to 
an increase in total fertility. At the same time, there is some indication that this policy has led 
to a disproportionate increase in birthrates among poor and marginalized population groups. 
This tendency suggests the existence of other impediments to increasing fertility, and the 
current paper focuses on one of them: the motherhood wage penalty. The high motherhood 
wage penalty may explain the ineffectiveness of the baby bonus across the population, 
combined with an increase in birth rates among low wage earners or those not in the labor 
force: the lower is RQH¶Vwage, the more likely it is that the fixed amount of the baby bonus 
will compensate for that loss of wages. 
After controlling for human capital characteristics and the unobserved time-invariant 
heterogeneity, such as preferences for children and individual relative productivity in the job 
market, the estimated motherhood wage penalty in Ukraine is quite high. In particular, the 
average wage penalty for being a mother in Ukraine is approximately 19%. Females with only 
one child earn 17% less than females without children, and females with two or more children 
earn approximately 29% less.  
Our analysis reveals heterogeneity in the estimates across educational groups, 
depending on the age at first birth, and with respect to marital status. Women with higher 
education suffer the lowest motherhood wage penalty compared to those with lower levels of 
education (11% vs. 18% per child). There is no evidence of benefit in postponing KDYLQJRQH¶V
first child. On the contrary, delaying first birth till age 30 and above is associated with the 
highest motherhood wage penalty, but only among those with the lowest levels of education. 
                                                          





Moreover, women who are not married are suffering from the highest motherhood wage 
penalty, especially when having two or more children. The analysis of the heterogeneity of 
the effect suggests that the motherhood wage penalty is the highest among single women with 
high school education or less, who gave birth to her first child at age 30 or above, when she 
has two or more children 0-18 years old. 
Comparing the results from the main estimation to those obtained from the data 
restricted to women of childbearing age, we reach the conclusion that approximately half of 
the motherhood wage penalty can be attributed to discrimination, since both current mothers 
and potential mothers should have minimum differences with respect to the risk of being 
discriminated against. 
While the estimate of the motherhood wage penalty of 19% is too high as for the country 
with relatively generous maternity leave policies, it is too low as for the country which 
combines these generous policies with the cultural norms opposing employment of the 
mothers with young children.. Based on the World Values Survey data, Figure 4 suggests that 
Ukrainian society is very similar to Germany regarding attitudes toward maternal 
employment, and therefore, we would expect the penalty to be closer to 33% (Budig, Misra, 
and Boeckmann 2012). However, this is not the case. As in the equilibrium the cost of 
maternity leave provision is transferred almost completely into lower wages of mothers (and 
sometimes women in general because of statistical discrimination), the motherhood wage 
penalty of the magnitude much lower than that in Germany can be explained by the lack of 
law enforcement and poor judicial system, so that employers do not have to bear the full cost 
of the mandates. Evidence suggests that Ukraine has probably the most de facto liberal labor 
market environment, where the employers do not bear any responsibility for discriminating 
against women/mothers, even though there is a de jure provision for secured rights of pregnant 
women and mothers. This is achieved through an informal arrangement either as a promise 
taken at the start of a job to leave the position once a woman is pregnant, or a provision of an 
XQGDWHG OHWWHU UHTXHVWLQJTXLW DW ³RZQZLOO´ZKLFK WKHHPSOR\HUXVHVRQFH WKH³WKUHat of 
SUHJQDQF\´EHFRPHVDUHDOLW\ In addition, existing cultural support for the involvement of 
grandparents in childcare combined with the relatively early retirement age works towards 
the same direction to lower the motherhood wage penalty. 
A simplified comparison of the motherhood wage penalty with the size of the current 
baby bonus payments shows the following. The estimated 20% motherhood wage penalty 





approximately 607 UAH per month. As this penalty has been estimated for the sample of 
mothers with children 0-18 years old, we assume that this is the period over which the penalty 
applies. These are the costs net of the losses through human capital channels, such as 
education and experience. Using the current bank interest rate of 15.6% per year, the net 
present value of the motherhood wage penalty over 18 years is UAH 44,39424 assuming no 
increase in nominal wages (UAH 57,437 at 5% annual wage growth, UAH 77,109 at 10% 
annual wage growth). The current baby bonus is set at UAH 41,280, which is divided into a 
lump sum payment of UAH 10,320 immediately following childbirth and 860 per month for 
the next three years, which has the NPV of UAH 34,920. This is 10,000 less than the most 
conservative NPV of the motherhood wage penalty. Although the difference does not seem 
to be insurmountable, one should remember that the calculation of the cumulative motherhood 
wage penalty is based on the average monthly wage, while the amount of the baby bonus is 
fixed. Thus, the higher the wage, the larger is the difference between the cumulative 
motherhood wage penalty and the baby bonus, and therefore, less effective the baby bonus is 
in stimulating fertility among higher earners. This may explain the evidence of the 
disproportionate increase in fertility among poor and marginalized groups of the population.25 
Looking ahead for the reforms after the Revolution of dignity, we expect an upward 
pressure on the motherhood wage penalty hindering any attempts to slower down population 
GHFOLQHZKLFKUHSUHVHQWVDFOHDUWKUHDWWRWKHFRXQWU\¶VORQJ-term economic growth. First, 
this relates to the legal system reform which would lead to greater enforcement of existing 
legislation, and therefore increase the cost of maternity leave to employers. Second, the 
inevitable Pensions reform will increase the statutory retirement age and therefore decrease 
availability of alternative childcare options from grandparents. Both of these reforms will 
create pressure to increase the motherhood wage penalty. And, although there is no way to 
avoid these much needed changes, policy makers can prepare to tackle their unintended 
negative consequences. Based on our interpretation of the literature, this could be achieved 
through two channels. One is to improve the quality and availability of public childcare and/or 
create an attractive business environment for private initiatives in this sector. The other is to 
promote cultural norms supporting maternal employment through information campaigns. 
 
                                                          
24 http://www.calculatorsoup.com/calculators/financial/present-value-cash-flows-calculator.php used for calculations. 
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Figure 1: Average wage of females in the regression sample. 
 
 
Figure 2: Birth rate coefficients in Ukraine by age of mothers (number of newborns per 1000 of females of 
correspondent age 26) in 1990-2013 Source: State Statistical Committee (http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua) 
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Figure 3: Comparison of attitudes toward maternal employment in Ukraine based on agreement with the statement 





























Figure 4: Comparison of attitudes toward maternal employment in different countries based on agreement with the 
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Table 1: Selected results on the wage penalty of motherhood from the previous literature 
Study Data set Methods Results 
Budig, M.J. and 
England, P. (2001)  
1982-1993 
NLSY  
FE and OLS  The wage penalty 7% per child (5% 
controlling for work experience)  
Datta Gupta and 






Temporary 6-7% negative effects. 
The effect disappears by the age of 
40 
Hill, M.S. (1979)  1976 PSID  OLS  The wage penalty 6-7% per child. 
Korenman, S. and 
Neumark, D. (1990)  
1982 NLS-YW  OLS, FD,FE 
and IV  
The wage penalty 7% for one child 
and 22% for two or more children  
Kunze, A and Ejrnaes 
(2004) 
1975-1997 
IABS,  West 
Germany 
OLS and IV 10-20% drop in wages after first 
birth.  
Viitanen, T (2004) NCDS of UK OLS, double 
selection 
The 19%-22% wage penalty, 10%-
13% obtained from double selection 
model. 
Waldfogel, J. (1995)  NCDS  OLS, FD and 
FE 
The average wage penalty for 
motherhood 22%  
Waldfogel, J. (1997)  1968- 1988 
NLS-YW  
OLS, FD and 
FE 
The wage penalty 4% for one child 




YW  and 
1991 NLSY  
OLS  The wage penalty at age 30 17% in 





OLS, FD and 
FE 
The wage penalty 20% for US at age 
30 and 20% for UK at age 33  
Almuendo-Dorates, 
and Kimmel, (2005). 
NLSY 79 OLS, FE The wage penalty is 6,3% for one 







Table 2: Descriptive statistics of working age females (ULMS 1997, 2007 and 1997-2007) 
Variable (%) 1997 2007 
Pooled 
1997-2007 
all employed all employed all employed 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Age<25 15,31 4,07 16,74 8,74 17,27 6,97 
    25-35 18,08 17,9 17,96 19,77 17,83 18,8 
    35-45 21,37 28,11 19,34 28,11 19,77 28,08 
    45-55 23,12 33,14 23,89 29,62 23,86 32,32 
    55-65 22,12 16,79 22,07 13,76 21,26 13,83 
Children       
    none 47,51 33,14 47,24 40,25 46,56 33,38 
    one 32,69 42,23 33,93 38,29 32,92 40,55 
    two 17,4 21,97 16,45 19,5 17,92 23,44 
    more than 
two 
2,4 2,66 2,37 1,96 2,6 2,63 
Education       
    high school[1] 44,51 28,25 33,03 19,83 40,44 24,59 
    vocational  41,85 51,48 49,78 55,71 44,88 53,04 
    university  13,64 20,27 17,19 24,46 14,68 22,37 
Married 57,5 69,01 63,34 65,82 57,7 66,29 
Employed 56,74 100 55,23 100 53,47 100 
Wage(monthly) 
 
383,10  800,27 
 
428,20 
(234.56)  (669.96) (399.31) 





N 3833 1352 3118 1533 39563 15656 
EŽƚĞ ?ƌĞĚƵĐƚŝŽŶŝŶƚŚĞƐĂŵƉůĞƐŝǌĞǁŚĞŶŐŽŝŶŐĨƌŽŵĨƵůůƐĂŵƉůĞƚŽƚŚĞĂŶĂůǇƚŝĐƐĂŵƉůĞ ?ĐĂůůĞĚ “ĞŵƉůŽǇĞĚ ? )ŝƐĚƵĞƚŽ
restrictions on working age, work status, and wage information available. Standard errors are in parenthesis, presented 






Table 3: Descriptive statistics female sub - sample of ULMS data set (Pooled) 
VARIABLES all females  mothers not mothers 
  all  employed all  employed all  employed 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Current mother (%) 53.44 66.62 100.00 100.00   






























No children (%) 46.56 33.38 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
One child (%) 32.92 40.55 61.61 60.87   
Two or more children (%) 20.52 26.07 38.39 39.13   


























High school (%) 40.44 24.59 30.20 23.55 52.20 26.67 
Professional/Vocational (%) 44.88 53.04 52.36 54.04 36.28 51.05 
University (%) 14.68 22.37 17.43 22.42 11.52 22.27 
Married (%) 57.70 66.29 74.92 74.86 37.94 49.18 
Never married (%) 14.19 9.40 2.67 2.45 27.41 23.27 






































# Observations 39563 15656 21142 10430 18421 5226 
Note: A ƌĞĚƵĐƚŝŽŶŝŶƚŚĞƐĂŵƉůĞƐŝǌĞǁŚĞŶŐŽŝŶŐĨƌŽŵĨƵůůƐĂŵƉůĞƚŽƚŚĞĂŶĂůǇƚŝĐƐĂŵƉůĞ ?ĐĂůůĞĚ “ĞŵƉůŽǇĞĚ ? )ŝƐĚƵĞƚŽ
restrictions on working age, work status, and wage information available. Standard errors are in parenthesis, presented 






Table 4: Results of estimation of log-wage regression. ULMS 1997-2007. 










(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 



























































































































Share of experience in 













Observations 15,656 15,656 15,656 15,656 14,849 
Adjusted R-squared 0.059 0.059 0.677 ? 0.606 ? 0.690 ? 
Number of id     2,856 2,856 2,722 
EŽƚĞ ? ?ŝŶĚŝĐĂƚĞƐŝŶƐƚĂŶĐĞƐǁŚĞŶZ-squared has been taken from the areg command in Stata. Individually clustered 








Table 5: Fixed effect estimates for wage penalties for different model specifications. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel A: Main Specification 
Ever mother 
-0.1851** 
(0.0262)   
 
Number of children  -0.1514** 
(0.0192) 
  
One child    
-0.1693** 
(0.0263)  
Two or more children    -0.2913** 
(0.0395)  
Number of children (0-6)     -0.0886** 
(0.0264) 
Number of children (7-18)    -0.1676** 
(0.0198) 
Panel B: Alternative Specification  ? controlling for having children older than 18 
Ever mother 
-0.1941** 
(0.0285)   
 





One child    
-0.1801** 
(0.0286)  






















Panel C: Main Specification  ? sample of women of childbearing age 
Ever mother -0.1038** 
(0.0313)] 
   

























Notes: Individually clustered standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). All regressions are from 






Table 6: Fixed effect estimates of the wage penalty for motherhood by education level and timing of the first birth. ULMS 1997-2004 
  
All  High school or Lower Vocational/ 
Professional 
Bachelor Degree or 
Higher 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 























(Number of kids)  ? ? ? ?A? 









(Number of kids)  ? ? ? ?A? 









(Number of kids) *( age 









Observations 15,656 15,656 3,850 3,850 8,304 8,304 3,502 3,502 
Number of id 2,856 2,856 850 850 1,578 1,578 606 606 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). Numbers in parenthesis are clustered standard errors. All regressions are from the fixed effect estimation 
with selection and include controls as in Table 4. Results in columns (4), (6), and (8) are drawn from the same regression with interactions. Grey background of the cell in the table 
implies that the estimate is different from the ones for the lowest educational group at least at 10% level of significance (within the row). Estimates in bold indicate that they are 
statistically different from the estimate for the number of kids when the age at first birth is less than 20 within the same educational group (within the column). In Column (2), 
none of the coefficients are significantly different from each other, with the exception of the effect of number of kids at the age at 1st ďŝƌƚŚA? ? ?ǁŚĞŶĐŽŵƉĂƌĞĚƚŽƚŚĂƚĂƚ ? ? ?A?ĂŐĞ
at 1st birth <30), which is marginally significant. In Column 4, not only the coefficients in bold are statistically different from the effect of the number of kids at the youngest age at 











Table A1: The amount of Baby bonus in Ukraine, USD 
Year 
 
Size of the payment 
 1st Child  2nd Child  3rd Child 
2001  32  32  32 
2002  38  38  38 
2003  60  60  60 
2004  127  127  127 
2005  287  287  287 
2006   1574  1574  1574 
 Full amount 1st payment Full amount 1st payment Full amount 1st 
payment 
2008 2423 950 4950 958 9901 990 
2011 2469 1010 5049 1010 10098 1010 
2012 3829 1276 7659 1276 15317 1276 
2013 4172 1391 8344 1391 16688 1391 
 




all women low educated 
 
 
women with vocational/professional education women with higher education 
 
 
Figure A1. Distribution of age at first birth by education 
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